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Abstract. We consider concurrent stochastic games played on graphs
with reachability and safety objectives. These games can be solved by
value iteration as well as strategy iteration, each of them yielding a se-
quence of under-approximations of the reachability value and a sequence
of over-approximation of the safety value, converging to it in the limit.
For both approaches, we provide the first (anytime) algorithms with
stopping criteria. The stopping criterion for value iteration is based on
providing a convergent sequence of over-approximations, which then al-
lows to estimate the distance to the true value. For strategy iteration, we
bound the error by complementing the strategy iteration algorithm for
reachability by a new strategy iteration algorithm under-approximating
the safety-value.
1 Introduction
A concurrent stochastic game [10] is a two-player game played on a graph. At
every round of the game, each player simultaneously and independently chooses
a move. The moves then jointly determine the transition taken, which leads to
a probability distribution over states. We consider safety and reachability objec-
tives [10]. Considering a safety objective for player S , its goal is to maximize
the probability of staying within a given set of states, while player R maximizes
the probability to leave this set, which is its reachability objective. Hence, the
two objectives are dual, the games are symmetric by swapping the players and
thus, from now on we refer to both simply as concurrent games (CG). These
games are determined [14], i.e. the supremum probability which player S can
ensure for staying in the safe set is equal to one minus the supremum probability
which player R can ensure for reaching a state outside. Deciding whether this
value is at least p for p ∈ [0, 1] is in PSPACE [13]. For the reachability objective,
player R is only guaranteed the existence of ǫ-optimal (memoryless randomized)
strategies [14]. For player S , optimal (again memoryless randomized) strategies
exist [19].
Algorithms for concurrent reachability games have been further studied and
their termination discussed in [4,3,6]. The algorithms for solving the games are
based on dynamic programming, namely value iteration (VI) and strategy itera-
tion (SI):
Firstly, VI produces a non-decreasing sequence that under-approximates the
optimal probability to reach the given states and in the limit converges to it [11].
However, no stopping criterion is known for this process. Hence, the current
error cannot be bounded at a given moment. Although this sequence yields by
determinacy an over-approximation for the value of the safety objective, there are
no known sequences over-approximating the reachability value or dually under-
approximating the safety value that would converge to the actual values. Our
first contribution is an algorithm producing such a sequence, thus yielding the
first stopping criterion for VI for these games and an anytime VI algorithm,
which at any moment can bound the current imprecision in the approximation,
converging to 0. Indeed, whenever the under- and over-approximations are less
than ǫ apart, for ǫ > 0, they are also ǫ-close to the actual value of the game.
Secondly, SI produces a sequence of strategies guaranteeing non-decreasing
probabilities to reach the given states, converging in the limit to the ǫ-optimum.
SI can thus provide under-approximating sequence for reachability. However,
similarly to VI, the known approaches only work for reachability and not for
safety. Our second contribution is an SI algorithm, which converges to the safety-
value from below. Again, this yields a stopping criterion for SI and an anytime
SI algorithm.
Our Approach As mentioned above, the over-approximations coming from known
VI algorithms for reachability as well as the under-approximations coming from
known SI algorithms for safety [3] are not converging to the true value of the
game [6]. The reason for this is the presence of so-called end components (EC) [8].
In technical terms, due to ECs the greatest fixpoint of the VI operator (also called
Bellman update) is different from the least one. While the over-approximations
converge to the greatest fixpoint, the true value is the least fixpoint. This problem
actually exists even for the much simpler single-player case of Markov decision
processes (MDP) [20].
For MDP, this issue has been solved by collapsing each EC into a single
state, effectively erasing indefinite cycles [2,15]. This prevents states of an EC to
rely on each other’s unsubstantiated overly high estimate of the value, reduces
their estimate at once to that of the actions leaving the EC, causing all the
fixpoints to coincide. This has been observed insufficient [16] for simple stochastic
games (SSG) [7], i.e. “turn-based” CG where in each state only one player has a
non-trivial choice. As opposed to MDP, states of the same EC in an SSG may
have different values, hence, cannot be all collapsed and their estimates reduced
to the same value. Instead, [16] proposes to gradually deflate (decrease) each
estimate whenever it is not substantiated by a move with that estimate leaving
the EC (with positive probability). Since there are different leaving moves with
different values, this gives rise to different parts of an EC called simple EC, each
corresponding to a sphere of influence of each leaving move with potentially
different values.
In our setting, the main challenge is to find the analogue to the simple EC
and how to deflate them in the right way. In [16], ECs are set of states such that
there exists a set of moves, which only lead to states inside the EC, but still, for
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any two states in the EC, there exists a finite path between them only taking
transitions labeled with the given moves. This definition of ECs reveals already
one big obstacle when it comes to CG: The set of states, which transitions with a
given move lead to, depends on the other player’s simultaneous and independent
choice. Hence, the given definition of EC does not prove to be suitable in our
setting. Instead, a matrix game has to be solved repetitively for each state to
determine the best distribution over available moves. In this matrix game, we
have to face another issue, namely that an extremum over all strategies leaving
an EC with a positive (arbitrary small) probability may be realized only by an
optimal strategy that is leaving with zero probability, i.e. not leaving at all. For
instance, consider Fig. 2, for ǫ→ 0, the strategy, which assigns ǫ to move b and
(1 − ǫ) to move a yields an increasingly better value for the matrix game at s1
with respect to strategies assigning a positive probability to states outside the
EC. The supremum of this sequence is 1, however the strategy achieving it is not
exiting anymore. Once the matrix game is solved, the sphere of influence of a
leaving convex combination of moves can be computed by the classical attractor
construction, yielding the desired analogue of the simple EC. This can then be
finally deflated according to our notion of the best value when leaving the EC.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge for the first time, we adapt such a parallel
under-/over-approximating VI approach to SI on CG.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
– We introduce a VI algorithm yielding both under- and over-approximation
sequences, both of which converge to the value of the game. Thus, we present
the first stopping criterion for VI on CG and the first anytime algorithm with
guaranteed precision.
– We introduce an SI algorithm for safety strategies in CG. Since these results
in both under- and over-approximation sequences for both objectives, we
analogously obtain the first stopping criterion for SI on CG and the first
anytime algorithm with guaranteed precision.
– As direct consequences, we obtain (i) that for CG without non-trivial end
components, the simpler solution (without deflating), is sufficient, and (ii)
an SI algorithm for safety SSG that is simpler than Algorithm 2 in [6], which
needs to transform the game.
Further Related Work The PSPACE-algorithm given in [13] to decide whether
the value of a given recursive game is at least p for p ∈ [0, 1] allows for a trivial
stopping criterion by iteratively executing this algorithm for a suitable sequence
of (pi)i∈N (intuitively, we try to choose pi such at alternatingly, the value of
the game is above and below the true value, while the distance between to suc-
ceeding pi monotonically decreases). However, this criterion is impractical since
it definitely need exponential time. The following stopping criteria we present
allow for a potentially fast approximation.
The idea of complementing the under-approximating sequence of VI by an
over-approximating one dates back to [18] as bounded VI (due to the new upper
bound). It does not converge for general MDP, but in fact only for MDP without
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ECs as often considered in the stochastic shortest path problem. The convergence
is ensured in [2,15] by collapsing ECs, in [2] on the fly, in [15] as a preprocessing
step, calling it interval iteration.
The first practical stopping criterion for SI in SSG ((but not for CG)) is given
in [6]. To this end, an SI algorithm for safety strategies is given, which relies on
a repetitive transformation of the underlying game. That the given algorithm
does not work properly for concurrent stochastic games has been observed in [6],
correcting the claims of [3]. Further, this approach is claimed not extensible to
VI. The first VI stopping criterion in SSG is obtained in [16], which we extend
here to CG.
A generalization of CG to ω-regular objectives has been considered in [9].
Value iteration via quantitative game µ-calculus has been discussed in [11]. As
to tool support, the only model checker for CG is PRISM-games [17]. Model
checking implementations for MDP that take stopping criteria into account are
extensions of PRISM [1] and Storm [12,21].
2 Stochastic Games
In this section, we recall basic notions related to stochastic games. For a count-
able setX , a function µ : X → [0, 1] is called a distribution overX if∑x∈X µ(x) =
1. The support of µ is Supp(µ) = {x | µ(x) > 0}. The set of all distributions over
X is denoted by µ(X). If there is a unique x ∈ X such that µ(x) = 1, we call
the distribution Dirac and denote it by δx.
Definition 1 ((Two-Player Stochastic) Concurrent Game). A concurrent
game is a tuple G = (S,M, Γ
R
, Γ
S
,T), where S is a finite set of states, M
is a finite set of moves, Γ
R
, Γ
S
: S → 2M \ ∅ are two move assignments and
T : S×M×M → µ(S) is a transition function. For p ∈ {R ,S }, assignment Γp
associates each state s ∈ S with a nonempty set Γp(s) ⊆ M of moves available
to player p at state s. T
(
s,m
R
,m
S
)(
s′
)
gives the probability of a transition
from state s to state s′ when player R chooses move m
R
∈ Γ
R
(s) and player S
move m
S
∈ Γ
S
(s).
A concurrent game is turn-based if for every state s there exists p ∈ {R ,S }
such that |Γp(s)| = 1; then we call it a turn-based game, rather than a turn-
based concurrent game. A play π of G is an infinite sequence s0s1s2 · · · of states
such that for all i ∈ N there are moves mi
R
∈ Γ
R
(si) and m
i
S
∈ Γ
S
(si) with
T
(
si,m
i
R
,mi
S
)(
si+1
)
> 0. We denote by Play(G) the set of all plays and by
Plays(G) the set of all plays s0s1s2 · · · such that s0 = s. A strategy for player p
is a function ρp : S → µ(M) that assigns to each state a distribution over moves
available to player p,1 i.e. for all s ∈ S, we have Supp(ρ(s)) ⊆ Γp(s). We call a
strategy pure if all distributions it returns are Dirac. In the following, we denote
1 Since memoryless strategies are sufficient for the objectives considered in this paper,
we do not introduce general history-dependent strategies to avoid clutter.
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byR the set of strategies for player R and by S the set of strategies for player S .
In addition, we use ρ to denote a single strategy of player R and σ to denote a
single strategy of player S .
Semantics. Given two strategies ρ and σ and a starting state s0, we give the
concurrent game the standard semantics in terms of a Markov chain with the
same state space S, the initial state s0, and the transition probabilities P given
by
P (s, s′) =
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
T
(
s,mR ,mS
)(
s′
) · ρ(s)(mR ) · σ(s)(mS )
We denote by P
ρ,σ
s0
the standard probability measure over the plays induced by
this Markov chain and define this to be the probability measure over plays of
the game when player R plays strategy ρ, player S plays strategy σ and the
game starts in state s0.
Reachability and Safety Objectives. Let Safe,Reach ⊆ S form a partitioning of S.
Reach denotes the set of states player R wants to reach, while Safe denotes the
set of states player S wants to confine the game in. We denote the reachability
objective by ♦Reach := {s0s1s2 · · · | ∃i ∈ N : si ∈ Reach} and the safety objective
by Safe := {s0s1s2 · · · | ∀i ∈ N : si ∈ Safe}. The value of the objective ♦Reach
at state s is given by
val(♦Reach)(s) := sup
ρ∈R
inf
σ∈S
Pρ,σs
(
♦Reach
)
and the value of the objective Safe by
val(Safe)(s) := sup
σ∈S
inf
ρ∈R
Pσ,ρs
(
Safe
)
.
Additionally, we define the value given a fixed strategy as valR :ρ(♦Reach)(s) :=
infσ∈S P
ρ,σ
s
(
♦Reach
)
and valS :σ (Safe)(s) := infρ∈R P
σ,ρ
s
(
Safe
)
. By the de-
terminacy of these games [14] and the duality of these objectives, we have
valR (♦Reach)(s)+ valS (Safe)(s) = 1 (since Reach and Safe partition the state
space).
Let s ∈ S, m
R
∈ Γ
R
(s) and m
S
∈ Γ
S
(s). We denote the set of potential
successors of s by Post(s,m
R
,m
S
) = Supp(T
(
s,m
R
,m
S
)
). In addition, we lift
the notation to strategies ρ and σ by
Post(s, ρ, σ) =
⋃
m
R
∈Supp(ρ(s))
⋃
m
S
∈Supp(σ(s))
Post(s,mR ,mS ).
We denote byW
S
:= {s | s ∈ S∧val(♦Reach)(s) = 0} the sure winning region
of playerS . It can be computed in at most |S|-steps by iterationW0
S
:= S\Reach
andWk+1
S
= {s ∈ S\Reach | ∃m
S
∈ Γ
S
(s) : ∀m
R
∈ Γ
R
(s) : Post(s,m
R
,m
S
) ⊆
Wk
S
} for all k ∈ N [9]. Consequently, we can assume without loss of generality
that Reach and W
S
are both singletons and absorbing.
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End Components. Let G = (S,M, Γ
R
, Γ
S
,T) be a concurrent game. A non-
empty set of states C ⊆ S is an end component if
– there exist a player R strategy ρ and a player S strategy σ such that for
each s ∈ C, we have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ C, and
– for every pair of states s, s′ ∈ C there is a play s0s1s2 · · · such that s0 = s
and sn = s
′ for some n, and for all 0 ≤ i < n, we have si ∈ C and it holds
si+1 ∈ Post(si, ρ, σ).
We call an end component C maximal if there exists no end component C′ such
that C ( C′ and trivial if |C| = 1.
3 Value Iteration
The idea of value iteration is to assign an initial estimate of the value to each
state and then to successively update it. For standard value iteration approxi-
mating the reachability value from below, the initial estimates have to be the
true values for Reach and W
S
, i.e. 1 and 0, respectively, and below the true
values elsewhere, e.g. 0. Each iteration step propagates the value one step back
further by maximizing the expectation of the value player R can ensure with
respect to the previous estimate.
Formally, we capture estimates as valuations, where a valuation υ : S → [0, 1]
is a function assigning each state s a real number υ(s) ∈ [0, 1] representing the
(approximate or true) value of the state. In addition, let υ,υ′ be two valuations,
we write υ ≤ υ′ if υ(s) ≤ υ′(s) for every s ∈ S. We can computed the expected
value at a state s for a given valuation υ and strategies ρ and σ by
Pre
ρ,σ(υ)(s) =
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
∑
s′∈S
υ(s′) · T(s,mR ,mS )(s′) · ρ(s)(mR ) · σ(s)(mS ).
3.1 Lower Bound.
For the rest of this section, we consider reachability games, where player R
tries to maximize the value. In Fig. 1, one can find a concurrent game, which
was originally presented in [5]. For this section, we set Reach = {s2} and
Safe = {s0, s1, s3, s4, s5} and let a, b be moves of player R and c, d moves of
player S . Hence, in Fig. 1, W
S
= {s2}, which is absorbing. [11] presents value
iteration from below. We define a slightly simplified version also used in [5]. In
the following, we denote by Lk the k-th iteration of value iteration from below,
where Lk is defined as follows:
L0(s) =if s ∈ Reach then 1 else 0 (1)
Lk+1(s) = sup
ρ∈R
inf
σ∈S
Pre
ρ,σ(L
k)(s) (2)
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s5 s4 s3 s0
s2
s1
d,1
c,1
a,1
b,1
ac,bd,1
,0.6
,0.4
bc,
1ad,
1
2
ad,
1
2


Fig. 1. A concurrent game, originally presented in [5].  denotes a move if a player
only has one available move in a state.
Since Reach is absorbing, we have Lk(s) = 1 for all s ∈ Reach and Lk(s) = 0
for all s ∈W
S
for all k ∈ N. To compute a monotonically increasing sequence of
valuations, we iterative apply the operator Pre to the lower bound. Computing
sup
ρ∈R infσ∈S Preρ,σ(L
k)(s) corresponds to solving a one-shot zero-sum matrix
game, for instance, for the following payoff matrix in iteration 0 at state s0:(
1 0
0 1
)
Row 1 corresponds to move a of player R , Row 2 to move b and Column 1
to move c and Column 2 to move d of player S . The content of the matrix
represents the payoff player R achieves. For instance, Cell 1,1 contains the payoff
for player R if player R chooses move a and player S chooses move c. Please
note that player R can ensure a value of 12 in this matrix game by choosing
move a with probability 12 and move b with probability
1
2 .
The following theorem states that sequentially updating the value of the
states of a game by solving one-shot matrix games at every state finally converges
to the true reachability value.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 from [11]). lim
k→∞
Lk = val(♦Reach)
Please note that the limit of Lk may not be reached in finitely many steps
since the value may be irrational [11].
3.2 Upper Bound.
Value iteration from below converges to the value, but at any point in time we
do not know how close we are to the value. To obtain a stopping criterion, we
devise an algorithm approximatingn the value from above. The distance between
the under- and the over-approximation in a state is then the distance we have
at most to the true value.
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Naïve Definition Naïvely, one could define an upper bound iteration as follows:
U0(s) =if s ∈WS then 0 else 1 (3)
Uk+1(s) = sup
ρ∈R
inf
σ∈S
Pre
ρ,σ(U
k)(s) (4)
For CGs, this iteration is a valid over-approximation, but only for CGs without
ECs, the iteration indeed monotonically converges to the reachability value from
above, which is formalized in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For a CG G without ECs in S\(W
S
∪Reach): lim
k→∞
Uk = val(♦Reach).
Proof Sketch of Theorem 2. Intuitively, the over-approximation will be up-
dated from Reach andW
S
backwards to the states with increasing distance from
Reach and W
S
. In EC-free games, it cannot happen that a set of states solely
depends on each other to determine the value. Hence, the updates emerging from
the correct values of Reach and W
S
will finally influence the value of all states.
We prove the correctness of this approach by first proving that Uk+1 ≤ Uk for
every k ∈ N by a simple induction over k, which also relies on Pre being mono-
tonic over valuations. In addition, we prove that val(♦Reach) ≤ Uk for all k ∈ N.
With an argument similar to the proof of Fixpoint Kleene’s Theorem, we show
that limk→∞ U
k = U∗ exists and PreR (U
∗) = U∗. This suffices to prove that
U∗ = val(♦Reach).
In the presence of non-trivial ECs the above theorem does not hold since
there is no unique fixpoint to the Bellman equations.
Example 1. In Fig. 2, U0 assigns 1 to both s1 and s2. We have U
k(s1) = 1 =
Uk(s2) for k ∈ N since the strategy, which assigns probability 1 to move a yields
the supremum for PreR (U
k)(s1) and PreR(U
k)(s2). However, such a strategy
yields effectively reachability value 0 for both states.
Bounded Value Iteration. Before we present how to overcome the issues of the
naïve upper bound iteration, We briefly present the overall bounded value iter-
ation algorithm. The goal finally is to define a method DEFLATE such that the
algorithm in Algorithm 1 yields a monotonically decreasing sequence of valua-
tions over-approximating the reachability value and converging to it in the limit,
which is summerized in Theorem 3.
Algorithm 1 depicts bounded value iteration, i.e. the parallel computation
of the upper and lower bound to bound the distance to the true value. If these
approximations are closer than ǫ, we know that both approximations are at most
ǫ-away from the real value.
Theorem 3 (Optimality of Upper Bound).
1. If Uk = Uk+1 for some k ∈ N in Algorithm 1, then Uk = val(♦Reach).
2. lim
k→∞
Uk = val(♦Reach) in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Bounded Value Iteration for Concurrent Games
1: Algorithm BVI(ǫ)
2: M := MEC(G) ⊲ M is the set of all maximal ECs.
3: k := 0 ⊲ L0 and U0 defined as above.
4: repeat
5: Lk+1 := PreR(L
k)
6: Uk+1 := PreR(U
k)
7: for C ∈ M do
8: DEFLATE(Uk+1,C)
9: k := k + 1
10: until
(
U(s0)− L(s0) ≤ ǫ
) ∨ (Uk = Uk−1) ∨ (Lk = Lk−1)
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3. To formally prove the claim, we show that DE-
FLATE is also monotone. Then, we can show that Uk+1 ≤ Uk for all k ∈ N. The
rest of the proof does not differ from the proof for games without non-trivial end
components, i.e. we show that U∗ is a unique fixpoint of the updates to Uk in
Algorithm 1, which suffices to show that U∗ is indeed valR .
s1s2
s3
s4
s0
a,1
a,1a, 1
2
b,1
b,
1
2
b, 1
2
a,1
a,1
a, 1
2
Fig. 2. We set Reach = {s3} and Safe = {s0, s1, s2, s4}. All states are fully controlled by
player R . Both s1 and s2 are not part of WS . Hence, U
0 assigns 1 to both states. Since
1 is larger than 0.5, Uk+1 still assigns 1 for all k ∈ N with an optimal strategy always
preferring move a over move b or any non-Dirac distribution over both. However, the
value this strategy yields will effectively be 0 since we never visit a state in Reach.
Theoretical Foundation of Deflating. There are two observations, which are cru-
cial for deflating: (1) A state in an EC cannot have a better reachability value
than it achieves by leaving the EC since staying in an EC outside of Reach will
effectively yield value 0. (2) The states in the end component may promise each
other unsubstantiated overly high reachability values.
Such a problem occurs, for instance, in the EC {s1, s2} in Fig. 2. If we initialize
all states except s4 with estimate 1, states s1 and s2 will always promise each
other value 1 although none of the states can really achieve it.
This process of adjusting the value in ECs is called deflating [16]. In more
detail, we will reduce the estimate of the reachability value in end components to
the best estimate they can achieve when forced to leave. Here, we define whether
a player stays or leaves the end component over its potential successors.
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For an end component C and a s ∈ C, we call a move m
R
∈ Γ
R
(s) stay-
ing if ∀m
S
∈ Γ
S
(s) : Post(s,m
R
,m
S
) ⊆ C and leaving if ∀m
S
∈ Γ
S
(s) :
Post(s,m
R
,m
S
) 6⊆ C
One can observe that single moves can be neither staying nor leaving in con-
current games. In turn-based games, the definitions of staying and leaving moves
are complementary since each state and thus, every transition, is controlled by
a single player.
Example 2. Consider for instance move a at state s1 for the EC {s1, s2} in Fig. 3.
Player R can neither enforce to stay in the EC nor can player R enforce to
leave it. The state s5 in Fig. 3 is an example of a state (and an end component),
which does not have any move m
R
for player R such that for all moves m
S
of
player S holds Post(s5,mR ,mS ) 6⊆ {s5}. However, the strategy, which assigns
probability 12 to both available moves ensures that states outside {s5} are seen
with positive probability.
To overcome this issue, we cannot simply restrict player R to strategies that
sign a positive probability to moves, which lead to states outside of the EC with
a positive probability since the limit of a sequence of such strategies might not
satisfy the property. This is a difficulty for the computation of Pre. Formally, for
an EC C, player R and s ∈ C, we denote by
Rexit(C)(s) :={ρ ∈ R | ∀σ ∈ S . Post(s, ρ, σ) 6⊆ C
∧ ∄mR ∈ Supp(ρ(s)) : ∀mS ∈ ΓS (s) : Post(s,mR ,mS ) ⊆ C}
the set of strategies, which force the play to leave C from s, while not using
any staying move. Now, we extend the pre-operator as follows:
Preexit(C)(υ)(s) := sup
ρ∈Rexit(C)(s)
inf
σ∈S
Pre
ρ,σ(υ)(s) (5)
We denote by bestexit(C)(υ)(s) ∈ Rexit(C)(s) one optimal strategy of the modi-
fied one-shot matrix game, which considers leaving strategies only. Such a strat-
egy exists since we only consider end components not in R or W
S
and a end
component without such a strategy is part of W
S
. We define the best exit of an
end component C for player i with respect to a valuation υ by
bestExitυ(C) := max
s∈C
Preexit(C)(υ)(s)
Algorithmically Deflating. We finally can devise an algorithm for DEFLATE. First
of all, please note that we can compute bestExitυ(C) by removing moves of
player R , which surely stay inside the end component, and by constraining the
solutions of the linear optimization problem to solve to such solutions assigning
a probability greater than 0 to states outside the end component C.
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s1s2
s3
s4
s5
ac
a
ac,
1
2
ac, 1
2
a
a
ac,bd
bc,ad, 1
2
bc,ad
,12
Fig. 3. We set Reach = {s3}, all other states are in Safe. ab, for instance, denotes that
player R plays move a and player S plays move b. The move a at state s1 is neither
leaving nor staying for EC {s1, s2} since the behavior of a depends on the move chosen
by player S . While player R can neither ensure to leave {s5} by move a nor by c,
but the strategy, which assigns 1
2
to both moves, ensures leaving {s5} with positive
probability.
Once we now the best exit of each state, we use the attractor construction
to compute the set of states, which can ensure to visit the states with the best
exit of an end component C as follows: Please note that we use the computation
of the attractor as in [9]. Let B ⊆ C, then
Attr0(B) :=B
Attrk+1(B) :=Attrk(B)∪
{s ∈ C | ∃mR ∈ ΓR(s) : ∀mS ∈ ΓS (s) : Post(s,mR ,mS ) ⊆ Attrk(B)}
The computation will clearly terminate after at most |C| iterations. Therefore,
we set Attr(B) := Attr|C|(B). This corresponds to the set of the states, for which
player R surely reaches B.2 This finally leads to the algorithm for deflating
presented in Algorithm 2. DEFLATE first computes the attractor of the best
exit, then updates all states in the end component and finally, removes all states
from the previously computed attractor. This process is iterated until there is
no state left. This intuitively leads to updates from the best to the worst best
exit (w.r.t. the current iteration) a player can enforce in state.
Example 3. In Table 1 we apply bounded value iteration on the game in Fig. 1.
We present the lower bound iteration on the left and the upper bound iteration
on the right. Since the value of s0 is irrational, it is not reached within finitely
many steps. However, in this example, we need only three steps to approximate
it with precision 0.01. Without deflating the upper bound after Iteration 1, the
upper bound for s3 would always be determined by the upper bound of s0. Yet,
if player R decides to always play a, then staying in the end component {s3, s4}
will yield the value 0. Hence, we must rather take into account the leaving action
2 The results in the subsequent sections also hold if we compute the set of states,
which reaches the set guaranteeing the best exit almost-surely.
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Algorithm 2 Update upper bound of a single MEC.
1: Algorithm DEFLATE(Uk+1,X )
2: repeat
3: B := Attr({s ∈ X | Preexit(X )(Uk+1)(s) = bestExitUk+1(X )})
4: for s ∈ X do
5: Uk+1(s) := min
(
U
k+1(s), bestExitU
k+1
(X ))
6: X := X \ B
7: until X = ∅
k \ state s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0.375 0 1 0 0 0.4
2 0.40741 0 1 0.4 0.4 0.4
3 0.41304 0 1 0.4 0.4 0.4
. . .
∗ √2− 1 0 1 0.4 0.4 0.4
k \ state s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0.5 0 1 1 1 0.4
DEFLATE 0.5 0 1 0.4 0.4 0.4
2 0.43 0 1 0.4 0.4 0.4
3 0.42 0 1 0.4 0.4 0.4
. . .
∗ √2− 1 0 1 0.4 0.4 0.4
Table 1. Lower Bound VI on the left and Upper Bound VI on the right for the Game
in Fig. 1, where we approximate the value for state s0 with decimals.
b from s3 which yields the true value of 0.4. This reasoning will be more apparent
in Example 4, where we also present the respective strategies for player S . Once
we have deflated the end component, all values remain constant except for that
of s0 which approaches
√
2− 1.
4 Strategy Iteration
In the previous section, we presented an algorithm for VI that can provide both
upper and lower bounds on the value, which converge to the actual value, at any
point in time. Another popular approach for solving games is SI. So far there
is no way of telling how close we have approximated the true value for general
concurrent games. For the lower bound, convergence results exist [6]. For the
upper bound, however, the only results so far are for the special case of turn-
based stochastic games. The problem with convergence of the upper bound is
the same as in the case of VI, namely mistakenly overestimating the value within
end components and thus not leaving them. We deal with end components by
deflating them to a safe over approximation that takes into account leaving
strategies.
For SI from below, we iteratively improve a given strategy for player R .
Note that for a given ρ ∈ R the value valR :ρ(♦Reach) always provides a lower
bound to the true value valR(♦Reach) = supρ′∈R valR :ρ′(♦Reach). Therefore, it
is not clear how to come up with an upper bound, given only a strategy for
player R . The key is to consider strategies for player S , as well. Using a similar
argument, a fixed strategy σ ∈ S always provides a lower bound valS :σ (Safe) ≤
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supσ′∈S valS :σ′(Safe) = valS (Safe). Since valR = 1− valS , we can compute
an upper bound for player R from a lower bound for player S . Taking this
discussion into account, the bounded SI algorithm works essentially the same as
that for bounded VI.
Algorithm 3 Strategy Iteration for Concurrent Games
Require: concurrent stochastic game G = (S,M, ΓR , ΓS ,T) with reach set Reach
Output: memoryless strategies ρ, σ
1: Algorithm SI
2: Compute WS = {s ∈ S | valS (Safe)(s) = 1}
3: Compute the set of all MECs M.
4: Let ρ0 ∈ R, σ0 ∈ S be arbitrary memoryless strategies and let k = 0.
5: repeat
6: Lk := val
R:ρk (♦Reach)
7: Uk := 1− val
S :σk(Safe)
8: for C ∈ M do
9: DEFLATE(σk,Uk,C)
10: Lk := {s ∈ S \ (WS ∪ Reach) | PreR(Lk)(s) 6= Lk(s)}
11: Uk := {s ∈ S \ (WS ∪ Reach) | PreS (1− Uk)(s) 6= 1− Uk(s)}
12: Compute ρ∗ ∈ R s.t. for s ∈ Lk holds PreR:ρ∗(Lk)(s) = PreR(Lk)(s)
13: Compute σ∗ ∈ S s.t. for s ∈ Uk holds PreS :σ∗(1−Uk)(s) = PreS (1−Uk)(s)
14: Define ρk+1 as follows for each state s ∈ S: ρk+1(s) :=
{
ρ
k(s) s 6∈ Lk
ρ
∗(s) s ∈ Lk
15: Define σk+1 as follows for each state s ∈ S: σk+1(s) :=
{
σk(s) s 6∈ Uk
σ∗(s) s ∈ Uk
16: k := k + 1
17: until Lk = ∅ or Uk = ∅ or |Uk − Lk| < ǫ
18: return ρk, σk
The computation of the lower bound in Algorithm 3 corresponds to the stan-
dard SI algorithm for which convergence is known [6]. We start with an arbitrary
strategy for player R . In the set Lk we store the states that currently under-
estimate the value. For those, we update the strategy such that it optimizes
for the current lower bound. The computation of the upper bound is analogous
except for the additional call to DEFLATE. Just as in bounded value iteration,
DEFLATE reduces the upper bound. For this, it computes the optimal player R
strategy (w.r.t the current upper bound) that leaves the end component. Then,
the player S strategy is adjusted, to be the best response to such a leaving
strategy of player R . We stop whenever one of the sets Lk or Uk is empty or the
difference between the lower and the upper bound is sufficiently small.
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Algorithm 4 Algorithm to Deflate the Safety Value in MECs for player S
1: Algorithm DEFLATE(σk+1,Uk+1,C)
2: repeat
3: B := Attr({s ∈ C | Preexit(C)(Uk+1)(s) = bestExitUk+1(C)})
4: Let ρ ∈ Rexit(C) s.t. PreR:ρ(Uk+1)(s) = bestExitU
k+1
(C) for all s ∈ B.
5: Let σ s.t. Preρ,σ (U
k+1)(s) = bestExitU
k+1
(C) for all s ∈ B
6: for s ∈ C do
7: Uk+1(s) := min(Uk+1(s), bestExitU
k+1
(C))
8: σk+1(s) := σ(s)
9: C := C \ B
10: until C = ∅
When comparing bounded strategy iteration to bounded value iteration, es-
sentially the only difference is that we keep track of the strategies that are used
to attain the current estimate of the respective bounds. Apart from that, most
of the computations are analogous to those in BVI. However, note that the com-
putation of Uk and Lk are quite different in that they are computed as the true
reachability value for fixed strategies. In contrast, BVI computes the bounds by
means of the Pre-operator. Intuitively, there is not much difference between the
two approaches as the Pre-operator computes the true value in the long run.
Since we have already proven the correctness of BVI, proving the correctness of
BSI amounts to showing that the two really behave the same in the long run,
which given the similarities is not too difficult.
The correctness of Algorithm 3 follows the proof of correctness for Algo-
rithm 1 of [6], which relies on the existence of a matching value iteration algo-
rithm.
Theorem 4.
val(Safe) = valS :σ∗(Safe)
where limi→∞ σ
i = σ∗ by Algorithm 3.
Proof Sketch. We prove Theorem 4 by an induction over k ∈ N, which shows
that 1−Uk ≤ υk ≤ val(Safe), where the last inequality trivially holds since no
strategy can provide a better value than the actual value. For the proof, we use
that DEFLATE is monotone and that all updates to σk just happen to indeed
provide the valuation υk.
Since the upper bound is computed as the complement to the safe value, the
above theorem implies that the upper bound converges to the true value.
Example 4. Consider again Fig. 1. In Table 2 we show the strategies and cor-
responding values for both players. The strategies are only given for the states
where the choices are non-trivial for the respective player. Since each player has
only two actions to choose from, we show the probability assignment for only one
of the actions, from which the assignment for the other action is straighforward
to compute.
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k \ state s0 s4
0 c: 0.5 c: 0.5
1 c: 0.4 c: 0
2 c: 0.41 c: 0
k \ state s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
0 0.33 0 1 0.33 0.37 0.40
1 0.40 0 1 0.40 0.40 0.40
2 0.41 0 1 0.40 0.40 0.40
k \ state s0 s3
0 a: 0.5 a: 0.5
DEFLATE a: 0.5 a: 1
1 a: 0.57 a: 1
2 a: 0.58 a: 1
k \ state s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
0 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.50 0.40
DEFLATE 0.50 0 1 0.40 0.40 0.40
1 0.43 0 1 0.40 0.40 0.40
2 0.42 0 1 0.40 0.40 0.40
Table 2. Strategy iteration for player R and player S on the top resp bottom. Strate-
gies on the left, corresponding values on the right.
In [5] the authors explain why strategy iteration from below for the safety
player does not converge for this game.3 If player R plays c from s4, then for
player S it seems as if it did not make a difference whether to play a or b from
s3 as both seem to realize the same value—namely that of s0. In fact, the best
response for player S at s3 is to play a in which case player R would attain the
value 0 when staying in the end component {s3, s4}. When computing Pre on the
upper bound, this fact is not properly reflected and therefore strategy iteration
for the safety player does not converge to the true value at states s3 and s4. In
step 0′, we correct this by calling DEFLATE and thus taking into account only
exiting strategies from s4. Having done so, player S realizes that the reasonable
choice at s3 is to play a rather than b.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have provided the first stopping criterion for both value and strategy iteration
on concurrent games with reachability and safety objectives as well as anytime
algorithms with the bounds on the current error. Since the games are concurrent
and since (ǫ-)optimal strategies may need to be randomized, we could not use
the technique of simple end components of [16]. Instead, we iteratively update
maximal end components and deflate only those states, which can ensure the
currently best exiting combination of moves. We leave an efficient implmentation
for future work, as an extension—similarly to [1,16]—of the standard model
checker PRISM-games [17].
3 Note that the game they present is not precisely the same. Concretely, on action
pair ad from s0 we go to s2 with probability 1/2 whereas in [5] we go to s1 instead.
However, the one-shot matrix the authors present corresponds to our version rather
than to theirs. Consequently, their argument applies to our game and does not apply
to theirs.
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A Additional Notation
A Markov decision process is a special case of concurrent games such that there
exists a p ∈ {R ,S } such that for all states s ∈ S holds |Γp| = 1 and a Markov
chain is a special case of SG Markov decision processes where for every i ∈
{R ,S } and for every state s holds |Γi| = 1.
A.1 Generalised Notion of Expected Value
We can compute the expected value for a given valuation υ and strategies π⊤
and π⊥ by
Preπ
⊤
,π
⊥
(υ)(s) =
∑
m
⊤
,m
⊥
∈M
∑
s′∈S
υ(s′) · T(s,m⊤ ,m⊥)(s′) · π⊤(s)(m⊤) · π⊥(s)(m⊥)
(6)
υ(s′) denotes the current estimate of the value for state s′ and it is weighted
by the probability to go from state s to state s′ given the moves m⊤ and m⊥
and their probability to be seen under strategies π⊤ and π⊥ . This probability
is computed by T
(
s,m⊤ ,m⊥
)(
s′
) · π⊤(s)(m⊤) · π⊥(s)(m⊥). Please note that we
deliberately avoid fixing players in the definition of the pre-operator Pre. Instead,
we associate ⊤ with the player, which tries to maximize the estimate, and ⊥
with the player, which tries to minimize it. For reachability, ⊤ will correspond
to player R maximizing the reachability value, while for safety, it will correspond
to player S maximizing the safety value. Minimizing and maximizing are added
with supremum and infimum computations over all strategies as follows:
Pre⊤:π
⊤
(υ)(s) = inf
π
⊥
∈Π
⊥
Pre
ρ,σ(υ)(s) (7)
Pre⊤(υ)(s) = sup
π
⊤
∈Π
⊤
Pre⊤:π
⊤
(υ)(s) (8)
(9)
Please note thatΠ⊤ denotes the set of all strategies for the maximizing player
(and Π⊥ the set of strategies for the minimizing player). The computation of
Pre⊤(υ)(s) reduces to the solution of a zero-sum one-shot matrix game and can
be solved by linear optimization. Optimal strategies in zero-sum one-shot games
need randomisation and we denote the strategy which can achieve the value of
Pre⊤(υ) by best⊤(υ). We give an example of the payoff matrix for a one-shot
zero-sum game corresponding to Pre⊤(υ)(s) in the next section.
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B Correctness Proof for Value Iteration
For this section, we fix a concurrent game G = (S,M, Γ
R
, Γ
S
,T). Moreover, we
fix the following notation:
bestυ(C) := {s ∈ C | Preexit(C)
R
(υ)(s) = bestExitυ(C)},
i.e. bestυ(C) is the set of states in C, which have an exiting strategy yielding the
value bestExitυ(C).
In order to proof the correctnes of bounded value iteration, it suffices to prove
that the sequence Uk converges to the actual value because the convergence of
Lk has already been proven. That is also the reason why we can make use of the
following two claims:
– val(♦Reach) is a fixpoint of the operator PreR , i.e. PreR(val(♦Reach)) =
val(♦Reach)
– The operators Pre and PreR are monotone, which we state in Lemma 5 for
simpler usage.
We proceed in to steps. First, we prove that Uk converges to a fixpoint.
Afterwards, we will show that this fixpoint coincides with the value.
B.1 Convergence to a fixpoint U⋆
In order to prove the convergence to a fixpoint, we essentially need to show that
the sequence is bounded from below and monotonically decreasing. First, we
show that Uk is indeed an upper bound of the value. The complex part of the
proof is the correctness of the DEFLATE. In this procedure, we reduce the upper
bounds of some states to the best exit from a subset of states. We start with
following lemma, which states that decreasing the value using DEFLATE never
decreases the current value below the true value.
Lemma 1. For S′ ⊆ S\(Reach∪W
S
) and all states s ∈ S′ we have val(♦Reach)(s) ≤
bestExitval(♦Reach)(S′).
Proof. Let X := {s ∈ S′ | val(♦Reach)(s) = maxs′∈S′ val(♦Reach)(s′)}. Consider
the following cases:
First Case: For some s ∈ X there is an optimal strategy ρ ∈ Rexit(S′)(s). Then,
val(♦Reach)(s′) ≤ val(♦Reach)(s) = PreR :ρ(val(♦Reach))(s) ≤ bestExitval(♦Reach)(S′)
for all s′ ∈ S′.
Second Case: There exists no s ∈ X with an optimal strategy ρ ∈ qRexit(S′)(s).
We distinguish two cases:
Case A: Let for all s ∈ X and ρ there is a σ such that Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ S′,
then due to the maximality of the values for states in X we must also
have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ X . Since none of the states chooses a leaving strategy
then and S′ ∩ Reach = ∅, it then holds val(♦Reach)(s) = 0 for all s ∈ X ,
which is a contradiction to the assumption (especially to S′ ∩W
S
= ∅.
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Case B: Let there be a s ∈ X with an optimal strategy ρ, such that for
all σ we have Post(s, ρ, σ) 6⊆ S′. Then, there must be moves m
R
∈
Supp(ρ(s)) s.t. for all m
S
we have Post(s,m
R
,m
S
) ⊆ S′ since we would
have ρ ∈ Rexit(S′)(s) otherwise, which is not the case by assumption. Let
M := {m
R
∈ M
R
| ∀m
S
∈ M
S
. Post(s,m
R
,m
S
) ⊆ S′} be a set of
moves for player R such that they lead to states in S′ for all moves of
player S . We modify ρ in such a way that moves in M are taken with
probability 0:
ρ
′(s)(mR ) :=
{
0 if m
R
∈ M
ρ(s)(m
R
)/(1 − x) otherwise
where x :=
∑
m
R
∈M ρ(s)(mR ). The strategy ρ
′ is well defined as
∑
m
R
∈M
R
ρ
′(s)(mR ) =
∑
m
R
∈M
R
\M
ρ(s)(mR )/(1− x)
= 1/(1− x) ·
∑
m
R
∈M
R
\M
ρ(s)(mR )
= 1/(1− x) · (1− x)
= 1
Then we have Post(s, ρ′, σ) 6⊆ S′ and especially, for all m
R
∈ Supp(ρ′(s)),
it holds for every m
S
∈ Supp(σ(s)) that Post(s,m
R
,m
S
) 6⊆ S′. By defi-
nition, it thus holds ρ′ ∈ Rexit(S′)(s). Since the value of states in X is max-
imal among the states in S′, the moves inM can yield at most the value
of the states in X . Since the remaining moves in Supp(ρ′(s)) have been in
Supp(ρ(s)) as well and thus, must at least guarantee the same value (we
could define a better strategy by choosing only moves in M otherwise),
we have PreR :ρ′(val(♦Reach))(s) = PreR :ρ(val(♦Reach))(s). Therefore,
for all states s′ ∈ S′ we have val(♦Reach)(s′) ≤ val(♦Reach)(s) = PreR :ρ′(val(♦Reach))(s) ≤
bestExitval(♦Reach)(S′).
We first prove that the sequence Uk is bounded from below by the true value
for states in end components. Later, we also show that is bounded for states that
are in no end component at all.
For a valuation υ, denote Di(υ), and Di(C) for the sequences of υ, resp. C
during DEFLATE. Then, we denote D|C|(υ) for υ at the end of DEFLATE.
The next lemma shows that during no iteration of DEFLATE he current value
is deflated below the true value.
Lemma 2. Assume U ≥ val(♦Reach). For a maximal end component C ⊆ S,
all states s ∈ C and i ≥ 0, we have Di(U)(s) ≥ val(♦Reach)(s).
Proof. We apply induction over i.
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Induction Basis: Let i = 0. Then, D0(U)(s) = U(s) ≥ val(♦Reach)(s) holds
by assumption.
Induction Hypothesis: For i ≥ 0 and s ∈ C we have Di(U)(s) ≥ val(♦Reach)(s).
Induction Step: Consider i+ 1.
Case A: Let s ∈ C. If s 6∈ Di(C), thenDi+1(U)(s) = Di(U)(s) I.H.≥ val(♦Reach)(s).
The first equality holds because DEFLATE does not affect states outside
of Di(C).
Case B: Assume that s ∈ Di(C). Then, Di+1(U)(s) = min(Di(U)(s), bestExitDi(U)(Di(C))) I.H.≥
min(val(♦Reach)(s), bestExitval(♦Reach)(Di(C))). By Lemma 1 we have bestExitval(♦Reach)(Di(C)) ≥
val(♦Reach)(s). Therefore, we can conclude that Di+1(U)(s) ≥ val(♦Reach)(s).
Having proven Lemma 2, it is a matter of a simple induction to show the
overall boundedness.
Lemma 3. For all k ≥ 0 we have Uk(s) ≥ val(♦Reach)(s) for all s ∈ S\(Reach∪
W
S
).
Proof. We apply induction over k.
Induction Basis: Let k = 0. We have U0(s) = 1 ≥ val(♦Reach)(s) for all
s ∈ S \ (Reach ∪W
S
).
Induction Hypothesis: Assume that Uk(s) ≥ val(♦Reach)(s) holds for all s ∈
S \ (Reach ∪W
S
).
Induction Step: If there is no end component C with s ∈ C, then Uk+1(s) =
PreR (U
k)(s)
I.H.≥ PreR(val(♦Reach))(s) = val(♦Reach)(s). If s ∈ C for a max-
imal end component C, then Uk+1(s) = D|C|(PreR(U
k))(s). With the induc-
tion hypothesis and monotonicty of PreR the claim follows from Lemma 2.
Now that we have shown that the upper bound is indeed a correct upper
bound of the value, we are ready to move our attention to monotonicity. This
is one of the most important statements for the correctness and the proof is
more involved than those of most of the others, which is the reason why we have
split it across several lemmas. The next lemma intuitively shows that deflating
is order-preserving in the sense that when applied to two valuations U1,U2 and
U2 ≤ U1, then also D|C|(U2) ≤ D|C|(U1). However, we prove a slightly more
general version of monotonicity in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Let U1,U2 be two valuations and C an end component such that the
following holds:
– PreR (U1) ≤ U1 and
– U2 ≤ PreR(D|C|(U1)).
Then, D|C|(U2) ≤ D|C|(U1).
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Proof. Evidently, DEFLATE can only decrease the valuation so D|C|(U2) ≤ U2.
Hence, it suffices to show that U2 ≤ D|C|(U1). We show by induction over i that
U2 ≤ Di(U1) for all i.
Base Case: Let i = 0. It holds D0(U1) = U1 ≥ PreR (U1) ≥ PreR (D|C|(U1)) ≥
U2.
Induction Hypothesis: Assume that U2 ≤ Di(U1).
Induction Step: Consider i+ 1.
Case A: First, assume that s 6∈ Di(C). In that caseDi+1(U1)(s) = Di(U1)(s)
I.H.≥
U2(s).
Case B: Now, assume that s ∈ Di(C). Then,
Di+1(U1)(s) = min(D
i(U1)(s), bestExit
Di(U1)(Di(C))).
Case 1: If Di+1(U1)(s) = D
i(U1)(s), then the claim again follows imme-
diately from the induction hypothesis.
Case 2: Otherwise, observe that for all s′ ∈ Di(C) we haveDi+1(U1)(s′) ≤
bestExitD
i(U1)(Di(C)) due to the above (minimizing) update, but
Di+1(U1)(s) = bestExit
Di(U1)(Di(C)) Therefore,
Di+1(U1)(s) = bestExit
Di(U1)(Di(C))
∗≥ PreR (Di+1(U1))(s)
≥ PreR (D|C|(U1))(s)
≥ U2(s).
The step labeled with ∗ holds due to our assumptions as well as the
monotonicity of Pre.
Lemma 5. For k ∈ N, we have PreR(Uk) ≤ Uk.
Proof. In [6].
Lemma 6. For k ∈ N, we have Uk ≥ Uk+1.
Proof. Induction Basis: k = 0. By definition, we have U0(s) = if s ∈W
S
then 0 else 1,
i.e. U0 is equal to 1 everywhere except W
S
. Since we assume winning to be
absorbing, PreR(U)(s) = 0 for any state s ∈ WS . Since PreR(U)(s) ≤ 1,
this also holds for any best exit. Hence, U0 ≥ U1.
Induction Hypothesis: Uk ≥ Uk+1.
Induction Step: We need to prove that Uk+1 ≥ Uk+2. Let s ∈ S\(W
S
∪Reach).
On W
S
, Ui is equal to 0 and on Reach to 1 for any i ∈ N.
Case A: s is not contained in any (maximal) end component. Then, Uk+2(s) =
PreR(U
k+1)(s) ≤ Uk+1(s) by Lemma 5.
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Case B: s ∈ C, for a maximal end component C. Denote U1 for Uk+1 be-
fore calling DEFLATE, and likewise let U2 be the valuation U
k+2 before
calling DEFLATE. Formally, U1 = PreR(U
k) and U2 = PreR(U
k+1). By
Lemma 5 we have PreR(U
k) ≤ Uk. Therefore,
PreR(U1) = PreR(PreR(U
k)) ≤ PreR(Uk) = U1
. Moreover,
U2 = D
|C|(PreR(U
k+1)) ≤ PreR (Uk+1) = PreR(D|C|(U1))
. Thus, the conditions of Lemma 4 hold and we can conclude
Uk+2(s) = D|C|(PreR (U
k+1))(s) = D|C|(U2))(s) ≤ D|C|(U1)(s) = D|C|(PreR (Uk))(s) = Uk+1(s)
.
Finally, we are in the position to show the convergence to a fixpoint. The
proof is essentially the same as for Kleene’s Fixpoint Theorem. However, our
valuations with the partial order ≤ are not a lattice as not every set of valuations
has a least element. Hence, we can not simply apply the theorem. Instead, we
show that we can argue in a similar way for our setting.
Theorem 5. U⋆ := limk→∞ U
k exists and F (U⋆) = U⋆, where F denotes the
update of U in Algorithm 1.
Please note that F (Uk) = Uk+1.
Proof. Let U := {Uk | k ≥ 0}. By Lemma 3 it follows that U is bounded from
below by val(♦Reach). Moreover, since F is montone by Lemma 6, there exists
inf U = limk→∞ Uk = U⋆. Since for any U ∈ U we have inf U ≤ U, due to the
monotonicity of F , we also have F (inf U) ≤ F (U). Hence, F (inf U) = inf F (U).
It follows that F (U⋆) = F (inf U) = inf F (U) = inf U = U⋆.
In the subsequent proofs we will often implicitly make use of the fact that
U⋆ is a fixpoint.
B.2 Uniqueness of the Fixpoint
The aim of this section is to show that the fixpoint U⋆ coincides with the true
value function. Doing so in absence of end components is fairly straightforward.
The DEFLATE procedure deals with the end components by reducing the upper
bound in a sound way, as we have proven in the previous section. In order to
prove that this fixpoint is equal to the value, we need to establish some further
properties about the fixpoint. Intuitively, we expect the claim to hold because
all changes of the upper bound are propagated to all states—even those that are
in an end component. However, since our DEFLATE procedure might operate on
subsets of states that are not end components, we need to show certain properties
for general subsets of the state space. The lemmas in this section essentially state
that the fixpoint behaves as we expect it to and culminate in Lemma 11. The
following lemma is quite natural to expect.
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Lemma 7. For all s ∈ S we have U⋆(s) = PreR (U⋆)(s).
Proof. For all states s ∈ S \ (W
S
∪Reach) we compute Uk+1(s) := PreR(Uk)(s).
Depending on whether or not s is in a maximal end component, we do or do not
process it further. Consider the cases:
Case A: There is no maximal end component C s.t. s ∈ C. Then, Uk+1(s) =
PreR (U
k)(s). Since U⋆ is a fixpoint (Theorem 5), it must hold that U⋆(s) =
PreR (U
⋆)(s).
Case B: Let C ⊆ S be a maximal end component with s ∈ C. Then, we have
Uk+1(s) = D|C|(PreR (U
k))(s). By Lemma 6 we have Uk(s) ≥ D|C|(PreR (Uk))(s) ≥
PreR (U
k)(s). Since U⋆ is the limit of this sequence, we have U⋆(s) ≥ PreR (U⋆)(s).
On the other hand, since U⋆ is a fixpoint, we have U⋆(s) = D|C|(PreR(U
⋆))(s) ≤
PreR (U
⋆)(s). Combining the two, we obtain U⋆(s) = PreR(U
⋆)(s), which was
to prove.
During DEFLATE we reduce the upper bound of states in an end component
in layers to the best exit from the current subset of the end component. In
the previous section, we have already justified why this is sound to do, in the
sense that we would never decrease the upper bound below the value. With the
following lemma we show that in the limit we can really attain the value of the
best exit.
Lemma 8. Let C ⊆ S be an end component, and Di(C) ⊆ C. Then, for all
s ∈ Attr(bestU⋆(Di(C))) we have U⋆(s) = bestExitU⋆(Di(C)).
Proof. Since U⋆ is a fixpoint and by definition of DEFLATE we have
U⋆(s) = min(U⋆(s), bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C))) ≤ bestExitU⋆(Di(C))
for all s ∈ Di(C). We show that for all s ∈ Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))) we have U⋆(s) ≥
bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)) by induction over k.
Induction Basis: Let k = 0 and s ∈ Attr0(bestU⋆(Di(C))) = bestU⋆(Di(C)).
Then, we have Pre
exit(Di(C))
R
(U⋆)(s) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)). Moreover U⋆(s)
∗
=
PreR (U
⋆)(s) ≥ Preexit(Di(C))
R
(U⋆)(s), where ∗ follows from Lemma 7. It follows
that U⋆(s) ≥ bestExitU⋆(Di(C)).
Induction Hypothesis: For all s ∈ Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))) we have U⋆(s) =
bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)).
Induction Step: Let s ∈ Attrk+1(bestU⋆(Di(C))). By definition of Attr there is
a ρ ∈ R, s.t. for all σ ∈ S we have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))). From
the induction hypothesis follows that for all s′ ∈ Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))) we
have U⋆(s′) ≥ bestExitU⋆(Di(C)). Hence, U⋆(s) ∗= PreR(U⋆)(s) ≥ PreR :ρ(U⋆)(s) ≥
bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)), where ∗ again holds by Lemma 7.
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The following two lemmas are essentially some technical overhead required
to prove Lemma 11, which can be considered the main step in proving the
correctness of the fixpoint. All complications stemming from end components
arise from overestimating the value within the end component and therefore
not taking into account what happens outside of it. With Lemma 11 we show
that the fixpoint of our algorithm always takes into account the values of states
outside any subset of the states.
Lemma 9. Let S′ ⊆ Di(C) ⊆ C, where C is a maximal end component, and S′∩
Attr(bestU
⋆
(Di(C))) 6= ∅. Then, there exists a state s ∈ S′ ∩ Attr(bestU⋆(Di(C))),
s.t. there is a ρ ∈ Rexit(S′)(s) with PreR :ρ(U⋆)(s) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)).
Proof. By definition Attr = Attr|D
i(C)|. We apply induction over k to show
that whenever S′ ∩ Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))) 6= ∅, then there exists a state s ∈
S′ ∩ Attrk(Di(C)) with the desired property.
Induction Basis: Let k = 0. Then, there is a s ∈ S′ ∩ bestU⋆(Di(C)). Hence,
there must be a ρ ∈ Rexit(Di(C))(s) with PreR :ρ(U⋆)(s) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)).
Since S′ ⊆ Di(C), it is also the case that ρ ∈ Rexit(S′)(s), which was to
construct.
Induction Hypothesis: If S′∩Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))) 6= ∅, there must be a state
s ∈ S′ ∩ Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))) s.t. there is a strategy ρ ∈ Rexit(S′)(s) with
PreR :ρ(U
⋆)(s) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)).
Induction Step: Consider k + 1. Let s ∈ S′ ∩ Attrk+1(bestU⋆(Di(C))). Then,
by definition of Attr there is a strategy ρ ∈ R, s.t. for all σ ∈ S we
have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆ Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))). By Lemma 8 we have U⋆(s′) =
bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)) for all s′ ∈ Attr(bestU⋆(Di(C))) ⊇ Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))).
Hence, PreR :ρ(U
⋆)(s) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)). If ρ ∈ Rexit(S′)(s), then we are
done. Otherwise, S′ ∩ Attrk(bestU⋆(Di(C))) 6= ∅ and the claim follows from
the induction hypothesis.
Lemma 10. Let S′ ⊆ C. For every state s ∈ S′ and every valuation υ, we have
Pre
exit(S′)
R
(υ)(s) ≥ Preexit(C)
R
(υ)(s).
Proof. We have Rexit(S′)(s) ⊇ Rexit(C)(s), since every strategy leaving C must
also leave S′ (S′ ⊆ C), but a strategy leaving S′ might still lead to states,
which are all in C and thus, may not leave C. With the fact that for sets A ⊇
B holds supA ≥ supB, the claim follows immediately from the definition of
PreR .
Lemma 11. For all S′ ⊆ S there is a s ∈ S′ with U⋆(s) = Preexit(S′)
R
(U⋆)(s).
Proof. By Lemma 7 we have U⋆(s) = PreR(U
⋆)(s) ≥ Preexit(S′)
R
(U⋆)(s). Therefore,
it suffices to prove that U⋆(s) ≤ Preexit(S′)
R
(U⋆)(s). We distinguish the following
cases:
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First Case: S′ is not an end component.
Then, for all ρ ∈ R and σ ∈ S , there is s ∈ S′, such that we have
Post(s, ρ, σ) 6⊆ S′. Note we can equivalently say that there exists a state
s ∈ S′, such that for all strategies ρ ∈ R and σ ∈ S , we have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆
S′. 4
Case A: There exists no (maximal) end component C with s ∈ C. Then
U⋆(s) = PreR(U
⋆)(s) = Pre
exit(S′)
R
(U⋆). The first equality holds by the
definition of BVI and from the fact that U⋆ is a fixpoint, and the second
equality holds because every strategy is exiting.
Case B: Assume that s ∈ C, where C is a maximal end component (i.e.
there exists a maximal end component, which shares some states with
S′).
Let Di(C) ⊆ C, s.t. s ∈ Attr(bestU⋆(Di(C))).
Case B1: If s ∈ bestU⋆(Di(C)), then υ := Preexit(Di(C))
R
(U⋆)(s) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)).
Case B2: Otherwise, there is a strategy ρ, s.t. for all σ we have Post(s, ρ, σ) ⊆
Attr(bestU
⋆
(Di(C))) by the definition of the attractor. By Lemma 8
we have U⋆(s′) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)) for all s′ ∈ Attr(bestU⋆(Di(C))).
Hence, υ := PreR :ρ(U
⋆)(s) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)).
In both cases, we have Pre
exit(S′)
R
(U⋆)(s) = PreR(U
⋆)(s) ≥ υ = bestExitU⋆(Di(C)) = U⋆(s)
Second Case: S′ is an end component. Then, let S′ ⊆ C, where C is a maximal
end component. Moreover, let Di(C) ⊆ C be the first subset during DEFLATE
such that s ∈ Attr(bestU⋆(Di(C))) holds for some s ∈ S′. Then, we have that
S′ ⊆ Di(C) and U⋆(s) = bestExitU⋆(Di(C)) holds by Lemma 8.
Case A: If s ∈ bestU⋆(Di(C)), then Preexit(Di(C))
R
(U⋆)(s) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)).
By Lemma 10 we then have Pre
exit(S′)
R
(U⋆)(s) ≥ U⋆(s).
Case B Otherwise, by assumption we have S′ ∩ Attr(bestU⋆(Di(C))) 6= ∅.
Therefore, Lemma 9 yields a state s′ ∈ S′ ∩ Attr(bestU⋆(Di(C))) and
a strategy ρ ∈ Rexit(S′)(s′), with PreR :ρ(U⋆)(s′) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)).
We conclude Pre
exit(S′)
R
(U⋆)(s′) ≥ PreR :ρ(U⋆)(s′) = bestExitU
⋆
(Di(C)) =
U⋆(s′). The last equality follows from the fact that s′ ∈ Attr(best(Di(C)))
and Lemma 8.
Having proven Lemma 11 it is not difficult to establish the main result of
this section:
Theorem 6. For s ∈ S have U⋆(s) = val(♦Reach)(s).
Proof. Assume there is a state s ∈ S, s.t.∆(s) := U⋆(s)−val(♦Reach)(s) > 0. Let
∆max := maxs∈S ∆(s) and S
′ := {s ∈ S | ∆(s) = ∆max}. We have Reach∩S′ = ∅
and W
S
∩ S′ = ∅ since the estimates of the reachability probabilities for Reach
and W
S
are correct throughout all iterations (and thus, also in the limit).
4 Of course, this is not a general logical equivalence, but in this case it is not difficult
to see that it holds.
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From Lemma 11 we obtain a s ∈ S′ and ρ ∈ Rexit(S′)(s) with U⋆(s) =
PreR :ρ(U
⋆)(s). Note that for all σ ∈ S we have Pre
ρ,σ(∆)(s) < ∆(s) be-
cause for all states s′ ∈ Post(s, ρ, σ) we have ∆(s′) ≤ ∆(s) and for at least
one s′ ∈ Post(s, ρ, σ) we have ∆(s′) < ∆(s). The former follows from the fact
that ∆(s) = ∆max, and the latter follows from the fact that ρ is an exiting
strategy. Hence we have
U⋆(s) = PreR :ρ(U
⋆)(s)
= inf
σ∈S
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
∑
s′∈S
U⋆(s′) · ρ(mR ) · σ(mS ) · T
(
s,mR ,mS
)(
s′
)
= inf
σ∈S
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
∑
s′∈S
(val(♦Reach)(s′) +∆(s′)) · ρ(mR ) · σ(mS ) · T
(
s,mR ,mS
)(
s′
)
= inf
σ∈S
Pre
ρ,σ (val(♦Reach))(s) + Preρ,σ(∆)(s)
< inf
σ∈S
Pre
ρ,σ (val(♦Reach))(s) +∆(s)
≤ sup
ρ∈R
inf
σ∈S
Pre
ρ,σ(val(♦Reach))(s) +∆(s)
= val(♦Reach)(s) +∆(s)
= U⋆(s)
We obtain the inequality U⋆(s) < U⋆(s) which is a contradiction.
C Correctness Proof for Strategy Iteration
Let G = (S,M, Γ
R
, Γ
S
,T) be a concurrent game with reachability objective Reach
and safety objective Safe s.t. Safe ∪˙Reach = S. W.l.o.g., we assume that W
S
,
i.e. the winning region of player S , and Reach are absorbing.
Lemma 12. Let υ be a valuation on S. DEFLATE(1−υ,C) = 1−INFLATE(υ,C)5.
Proof. For all states s 6∈ C the claim follows since υ(s) remains unchanged (in
both algorithms).
In the following, we only consider s ∈ C. For DEFLATE(1−υ,C) and INFLATE(υ,C),
the computation of B in every iteration conincides since the computation of the
set B is identical. Hence, the claim is proven by
1− INFLATE(υi,C)(s) = 1−max(υi(s), 1 − bestExit1−υi(Ci))
= min(1− υi(s)), 1− (1 − bestExit1−υi(Ci)))
= min(1− υi(s), bestExit1−υi(Ci))
= DEFLATE(1− υi,C)
5 In the following, we assume that DEFLATE and INFLATE return the updated valua-
tion (Uk+1 in the case of DEFLATE and υi in the case of INFLATE). We also ignore
the updates to σ∗ in INFLATE since they do not change the valuation.
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for all states s ∈ C, where i denotes the iteration, in which s gets updated (both
in DEFLATE and INFLATE since the computation of B always coincides).
Corollary 1. Let υ ≤ υ′. Then, INFLATE(υ,C) ≤ INFLATE(υ′,C).
Proof. For υ ≤ υ′ implies 1− υ ≥ 1− υ′. Hence, it holds6
DEFLATE(1− υ,C) ≥ DEFLATE(1 − υ′,C).
By Lemma 12, it holds 1 − INFLATE(υ,C) ≥ 1 − INFLATE(υ′,C) and thus,
INFLATE(υ,C) ≤ INFLATE(υ′,C).
Lemma 13. Let υ be a valuation. Then, 1− Pre⊤,R(υ) = Pre⊤,S (1− υ).
Proof. Let s ∈ S. In the following, we use that for the one-shot matrix game
Pre⊤(υ)(s), we can swap sup and inf.
1− Pre⊤,R(υ)(s)
=1− ( sup
ρ
inf
σ
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
∑
s′∈S
υ(s′) · T(s,mR ,mS )(s′) · ρ(s)(mR ) · σ(s)(mS ))
∗
=
(
inf
ρ
sup
σ
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
∑
s′∈S
(1− υ(s′)) · T(s,mR ,mS )(s′) · ρ(s)(mR ) · σ(s)(mS ))
=
(
sup
σ
inf
ρ
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
∑
s′∈S
(1− υ(s′)) · T(s,mR ,mS )(s′) · ρ(s)(mR ) · σ(s)(mS ))
=Pre⊤,S (1 − υ)(s)
For ∗ note that
1−
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
∑
s′∈S
υ(s′) · T(s,mR ,mS )(s′) · ρ(s)(mR ) · σ(s)(mS ) =
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
∑
s′∈S
(1− υ(s′)) · T(s,mR ,mS )(s′) · ρ(s)(mR ) · σ(s)(mS )
because
∑
m
R
,m
S
∈M
∑
s′∈S
T
(
s,mR ,mS
)(
s′
) · ρ(s)(mR ) · σ(s)(mS ).
6 We have proven that DEFLATE is monotone in Lemma 6 since we did not use any-
thing except Uk ≥ Uk+1 within the proof.
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Proof (Proof of Theorem 4).We define ηk(s) = 1−Uk(s). By Lemma 13, we know
that ηk+1(s) := Pre⊤,S (η
k)(s) = 1− Pre⊤,R(Uk)(s). In addition, we know that
INFLATE(ηk,C) = 1 − DEFLATE(Uk,C) for any maximal end component C ∈
M by Lemma 12. Thus, lim
k→∞
ηk = val(Safe) by determination of concurrent
reachability and safety games.
In INFLATE, we modify σk to be the best response to player R enforcing to
leave the end component, i.e. σk enforces υk for player S .
Since η0 ≤ υ0 for any σ0 and both Pre and INFLATE are monotone, we can
inductively prove that ηk ≤ υk. By defintion υk ≤ val(Safe). Hence, we have
ηk ≤ υk ≤ val(Safe) and val(Safe) ≤ υ∞ ≤ val(Safe) in the limit. Hence,
limk→∞ υ
k = val(Safe) and υk approximates the safety value monotonically
from below.
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